It is well known by now that government spending has typically been procyclical in developing economies but acyclical or countercyclical in industrial countries. Little, if any, is known, however, about the cyclical behavior of tax rates (as opposed to tax revenues, which are endogenous to the business cycle and hence cannot shed light on the cyclicality of tax policy). We build a novel dataset on tax rates for 62 countries for the period 1960-2009 that comprises corporate income, personal income, and value-added tax rates. We …nd that, by and large, tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries but mostly procyclical in developing countries. We show that the evidence is consistent with a model of optimal …scal policy under uncertainty.
Introduction
There is by now a strong consensus in the literature that …scal policy, or more precisely government spending, has been typically procyclical in developing countries and countercyclical or acyclical in industrial economies.
1 Figure 1 , which updates evidence presented in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) , illustrates this phenomenon by plotting the correlation between the cyclical components of output and government spending for 94 countries during the period . Yellow bars depict developing countries and black bars denote industrial economies. The visual impression is striking:
while a majority of black bars lie to the left of the …gure (indicating countercyclical government spending in industrial countries), the majority of yellow bars lie to the right (indicating procyclical government spending in developing countries). In fact, the average correlation is -0.17 for industrial countries and 0.35 for developing countries.
Several hypothesis have been put forth in the literature to explain the procyclical behavior of government spending in developing countries, ranging from limited access to international credit markets to political distortions that tend to encourage public spending during boom periods. While, as argued by Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2012) , some emerging economies have switched from being procyclical to countercyclical over the last decade (i.e., have "graduated"), …scal procyclicality remains a pervasive phenomenon in the developing world, which tends to reinforce -rather than mitigate -the underlying business cycle volatility.
The other pillar of …scal policy is, of course, taxation. A critical observation on the taxation side is that policymakers control tax rates, as opposed to tax revenues which vary endogenously with the tax base. Since we are interested in …scal policy, we therefore want to focus on tax rates, the policy instrument, and not tax revenues.
2 Unfortunately -and leaving aside a few studies focusing on individual countries such as Barro (1990) , Huang and Lin (1993) , Strazicich (1997) , Barro and Redlick (2011), and Romer and Romer (2012) for the United States and Maihos and Sosa (2000) for Uruguay -there is no systematic international evidence regarding the cyclicality of tax policy (i.e., cyclicality of tax rates). The main reason is, of course, the absence of readily-available cross-country data on tax rates. To get around this limitation, the literature has relied on the use of (i) the in ‡ation tax (Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2004) or (ii) tax revenues, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of GDP 1 See, for example, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) and the references therein. 2 An important clari…cation on terminology. We will say that tax policy is procyclical (countercyclical) when tax rates are negatively (positively) correlated with GDP suggesting that tax policy is amplifying (smoothing) the underlying business cycle. An acyclical tax policy captures the case of zero correlation (i.e., no systematic relation between tax rate and the business cycle). Perotti, 1997; Braun, 2001; Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha, 2001; Sturzenegger and Wernek, 2006) . Both approaches, however, have severe limitations.
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The problem with the …rst approach is that there is simply no consensus on whether the in ‡ation tax should be thought of as "just another tax." While there is, of course, a theoretical basis for doing so that dates back to Phelps (1973) and has been greatly re…ned ever since (see, for example, Chari and Kehoe (1999) ), there is little, if any, empirical support (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Poterba and Rotemberg, 1990; Edwards and Tabellini, 1991; Roubini, 1991) . Indeed, Delhy Nolivos and Vuletin (2012) show that the in ‡ation tax can be thought of as "just another tax" only when central bank independence is low in which case the …scal authority e¤ectively controls monetary policy and uses in ‡ation according to revenue needs. When central bank independence is high, however, in ‡ation is set by the central bank and is essentially divorced from …scal considerations. For whatever is worth, Figure   2 suggests and Table 1 , columns 1 and 2, con…rm that the in ‡ation tax commoves positively with the business cycle in most industrial countries while it is, on average, acyclical in developing countries.
Hence, if anything, one would conclude that tax policy in developing countries is not procylical which, as will become clear below, would be the incorrect conclusion to draw.
On the other hand -and as argued by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) -the second approach is fundamentally ‡awed because, as mentioned above, tax revenues constitute an outcome (as opposed to a policy instrument) that endogenously responds to the business cycle. Indeed, tax revenues almost always increase during booms and fall in recessions as the tax base (be it income or consumption) moves positively with the business cycle. Therefore, if tax revenues are positively related to the business cycle, there is little that we can infer regarding the cyclicality of tax rates since positivelyrelated tax revenues are consistent with higher, unchanged, and even lower tax rates during good times.
It is only when tax revenues are negatively related to the business cycle that we can conclude that tax policy is procyclical.
3 Since, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 , columns 3 and 4, tax revenues tend to be positively related to the business cycle, there is little that we can infer regarding the cyclicality of tax policy.
In an attempt to correct for the endogenous ‡uctuations in the tax base, some authors have used revenues as a ratio of GDP, referring to it as an "average tax burden." As discussed in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) , however, nothing can be inferred from such an indicator regarding the cyclical properties of the policy instrument (i.e., the tax rate). For these reasons, this …scal indicator is completely uninformative regarding tax policy cyclicality. To show the practical relevance of this point, Figure 4 and Table 1 , columns 5 and 6, show the correlation between the cyclical components of government revenue to GDP ratio and real GDP. Based on this, one would (erroneously!) conclude that tax policy is acyclical in industrial economies and countercyclical in developing countries. As we will show in this paper, tax policy is actually procyclical in most developing countries.
In sum, there is simply no good substitute for having data on tax rates when it comes to evaluating the cyclical properties of tax policy. This is precisely the purpose of this paper. To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to show systematic international evidence regarding the cyclicality of tax policy based on the use of the policy instrument (tax rate) as opposed to a tax outcome (tax revenues). To this end, we build a novel annual dataset that comprises value-added, corporate, and personal income tax rates for 62 countries, 20 industrial and 42 developing, for the period 1960-2009. Corporate and personal income tax rates are mainly obtained from the World Development Indicators (World Bank) and World Tax Database (University of Michigan, Ross School of Business). On the other hand, valueadded tax rates were obtained from various primary sources, including countries' revenue agencies, countries'national libraries, books, newspapers, tax law experts, as well as research and policy papers.
We should note that for 55 out of the 62 countries included in the sample, we were able to gather the complete time series of the value-added tax rate (i.e., since its introduction). We believe that this signi…cant e¤ort in collecting value-added tax rates is crucial for any study analyzing the developing world as well as Europe, where indirect/value-added taxation is a key and active component of …scal policy.
Using these tax rates, we compute the degree of cyclicality of each tax and of a tax index. From an identi…cation point of view, we also control for endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables. 4 We can summarize our main empirical …ndings as follows:
1. Tax policy is more volatile in developing countries than in industrial economies in the sense that developing countries change their tax rates by larger amounts than industrial economies. In particular, the volatility of tax policy in developing economies is about 25 to 50 percent more volatile than in industrial countries. This pattern matches the one observed on the spending side (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Singh, 2006) . Annual average variation in real government spending is about 60 percent higher in developing countries than in industrial economies.
2. Tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries and mostly procyclical in developing economies.
This empirical regularity is robust to a wide set of statistical and econometric methods as well as di¤erent ways of assessing the behavior of tax policy over the business cycle (percentage change or cyclical components of tax rates). Our …ndings also hold when using instrumental variables.
3. Countries with more procyclical spending policy typically have more procyclical tax policy and vice-versa. In other words, tax and spending policies are typically conducted in a symmetric/homogeneous way over the business cycle.
Why would the cyclical properties of …scal policy di¤er across industrial and developing countries?
One compelling explanation is the presence of imperfections in international credit markets (Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, and Talvi, 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004) . 5 To illustrate this idea, we present the simplest possible model of optimal …scal policy under incomplete markets. We show that government consumption is procyclical. Intuitively, government consumption acts much like private consumption and is higher (lower) in the good (bad) state of nature. Interestingly enough, however, the cyclical properties of tax policy depend on the cyclical behavior of public versus private spending. Under the most realistic parameterization in which the ratio of government spending to private consumption (which is the tax base) is higher (lower) in the bad (good) state of nature, tax rate policy is procyclical. Intuitively, if government spending is high relative to the tax base in bad times, the tax rate will need to be also high in order to satisfy the budget constraint. In good times, government spending will be low relative to the tax base, which calls for a lower tax rate. Further, the degree of procyclicality varies directly with output volatility.
We show that this prediction of the model is consistent with the data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses how to measure tax policy and brie ‡y elaborates on some of the practical pros and cons of focusing on di¤erent taxes. Section 3 presents the tax rate data used in the study. It also documents six empirical regularities about the frequency and average magnitude of tax changes and the volatility of tax policy. As background, Section 4 brie ‡y characterizes the tax revenue structure -both in terms of size and composition -of countries around the world.
Section 5 presents our main …ndings about the cyclicality of tax policy using alternative statistical and econometric methods as well as measures to assess the behavior of tax policy over the business cycle.
Section 6 addresses endogeneity issues. Section 7 shows some complementary evidence for a small sample of six industrial countries where average marginal personal income tax rate data are available.
Section 8 explores the relationship between cyclicality of tax and spending policies. Section 9 develops 5 The other, not necessarily inconsistent, explanation relies on political distortions (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2005) . We focus on credit market imperfections because (i) our simple model o¤ers new insights into the conditions needed for this channel to explain the data and (ii) we can match the model's key implications to the data. 5 a theoretical model of optimal …scal policy under uncertainty. Final thoughts are presented in Section 10.
Measuring tax policy
When analyzing the business cycle properties of spending policy, most papers use government spending or government consumption. These …scal variables represent the overall policy instrument on the spending side. In contrast, tax policy does not rely on a single tax rate associated with a single activity. Governments typically resort to many di¤erent taxes, including, among others, individual and corporate income, social security contributions, property, goods and services as well as taxes on trade and …nancial transactions. Many of these taxes, especially personal income taxes, have several brackets and an intricate system of deductions. These features complicate the extent to which researchers can unequivocally assess the stance and changes in tax policy. Up to now, most papers relying on tax rates have studied the United States while typically focusing on individual income taxes as well as social security contributions. Barro and Redlick (2011) use United States average annual marginal individual income tax rates from federal and state taxes as well as social security payroll taxes for the period 1913 -2006 . Romer and Romer (2012 analyze the evolution of individual marginal tax rates as well as corporate tax rates in the United States for the interwar period 1919-1941. Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin (2012) focus on value-added tax rates for 14 industrial countries for the period 1980-2009. No approach is completely satisfactory and, most likely, given the intricacies of the taxation system, none will ever be. That said, the profession seems to be moving in the right direction by devoting signi…cant e¤orts to gather new datasets on tax rates, allowing both researchers' and policymakers' better understanding of tax instruments (such as tax rates) behavior and e¤ect, as opposed to tax outcomes (such as tax revenues).
The main practical advantage of the VAT rate is that it consists of a single standard rate.
6 On the contrary, personal income taxes have several rates for di¤erent income brackets and an intricate system of deductions. The single rate allows the researcher to clearly assess the stance of tax policy.
As discussed in great detail in Barro and Redlick (2011) , changes in the average marginal individual tax rates (AMITR) may be triggered by shifts in the underlying distribution of marginal tax rates in a manner correlated with di¤erences in labor-supply elasticities (e.g., the 1948 tax cut). Moreover, increases in the AMITR, such as the one observed from 1971 to 1978, may re ‡ect the shift of households into higher brackets due to high in ‡ation in the context of an unindexed tax system. This concern seems to be particularly relevant in the case of the developing world as well as industrial countries with a long history of moderate/high and persistent levels of in ‡ation, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. A second identi…cation advantage of the VAT relates to the lag between the change in tax legislation and the household learning about it. As pointed out by Barro and Redlick (2011) , information regarding changes in tax rates, tax brackets, and deductions in the AMITR are arguably gradually learned by households throughout the year. This is indeed the main reason why Barro and Redlick (2011) use annual frequency data. In contrast, changes in VAT rate are arguably internalized promptly by households, since consumption is performed on a more continuos and frequent manner.
Given the above -and as described in the next section -we put a great deal of e¤ort in complementing existing databases on corporate and personal income with a novel database on VAT taxes.
Tax rate data
Part of this paper's contribution is the creation of a novel tax rate database that combines existing data on corporate and personal income tax rates with newly collected data on VAT taxes. Additionally, we collected new data on value-added tax rates. These data were obtained from various primary sources, including countries' revenue agencies, countries' national libraries, books, newspapers, tax law experts, as well as research and policy papers. 9 We should note that for 55 out of the 62 countries included in the sample, we were able to gather the complete time series of the value-added tax rate (i.e., since its introduction). 10 We believe that this signi…cant e¤ort in collecting value-added tax rates is crucial for any study analyzing the developing world as well as Europe, where indirect/value-added taxation is a critical component of …scal policy.
Needless to say, while fairly comprehensive, our dataset does not come free of limitations. In particular -and as is the case for most studies up to date -it does not include all available tax rates such as social security, trade, property, alcohol, and tobacco, among others. We should note, however, that value-added and corporate and personal income taxes represent around 65 percent of total tax revenues in developing countries and almost 80 percent in industrial countries. The following subsections brie ‡y characterize six basic empirical regularities about our tax rate data.
Long-run trends
Long-run tax rate trends di¤er across taxes. About two thirds of personal and corporate income tax rates changes are negative, both in industrial and developing countries ( 
Short-run patterns
In spite of the above-mentioned di¤erences in long-run trends across personal, corporate and valueadded rates, tax rates changes are somewhat synchronized in the short-run. In other words, ocasionally they tend to commove together in the short-run in spite of showing, generally speaking, di¤erent long-run trends. Table 3 shows that we cannot reject that tax rates changes are positively correlated across di¤erent taxes.
Frequency of changes
A key di¤erence between government spending -and for that matter most macroeconomic variablesand tax rates is that the latter rarely vary every year. 11 While government spending occurs more or less continuously throughout the budget cycle, changes in tax rates do not occur every year presumably because they typically require explicit approval from congress/parliament. Indeed, the overall sample frequency of tax rate changes is 0.19, 0.18, and 0.11 for personal, corporate, and value-added taxes, respectively. Put di¤erently, tax rates change, on average, about every 5 years for corporate and personal income taxes and every 9 years for value-added taxes. 
Average magnitude of changes
Both industrial and developing countries share some common average variation in tax rates (Table 4, panel B). For personal and corporate income taxes, tax rates change about 3 percent annually for each group. This …gure is about 2 percent for value-added taxes.
Naturally, the annual average change in tax rates varies signi…cantly across countries and taxes.
For example, Norway's annual average change in personal income tax rate is about 6 percent. This is the result of frequent changes in this tax rate, which has ‡uctuated from values close to 70 percent during the 1970s to about 25 percent during the 1980s, and back up again to the 40 percent range in the early 2000s. At the other side of the spectrum, Korea has never changed its VAT tax rate (of 10 percent) since its introduction in January 1977. 
Tax policy volatility
The similarity across groups of countries regarding the average magnitude of tax rate changes described in the previous subsection hides important di¤erences about the intensity/magnitude of tax 1 1 In this sense, tax rates ‡uctuations resemble more the pro…le observed in price changes for individual goods; see, for instance, Bils and Klenow (2004) . . 1 2 See Appendix 4, Table 4A , columns 1-3 for the corresponding country statistics.
9 rate changes. When focusing only on tax rate changes di¤erent from zero (i.e., when tax policy is active), developing economies show larger magnitude of tax rate changes than industrial countries across the board (Table 4, This regularity regarding tax policy volatility is consistent with the one observed on the government consumption side; developing countries show more volatile spending policy than industrial economies (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Singh, 2006) . Indeed, annual average variation in real government spending is about 60 percent higher in developing countries than in industrial economies included in our sample.
Frequency of change versus tax policy volatility
Figures 5, 6, and 7 plot country frequency of change and tax policy volatility measured as the percentage absolute change in tax rates without including zero changes. The …gures strongly support a negative relationship between the frequency of tax rate changes and tax policy volatility. Countries where changes in tax rates are relatively infrequent (i.e., low frequency of change) typically show high tax policy volatility (i.e., high intensity/magnitude of tax rate changes). In other words, frequency and magnitude of changes seems to act as substitutes: in countries where tax rates change regularly (infrequently), taxes vary by small magnitudes (large).
Tax revenue structure
In this section, we brie ‡y characterize the tax revenue structure -both in terms of size and composition -of countries around the world. The tax burden, de…ned as government revenue expressed as percentage of GDP, varies signi…cantly across countries, ranging from 42.1 percent for Norway to 7.3 percent for the Democratic Republic of Congo. 13 The average tax burden in industrial countries is 25.5 percent of GDP, compared to 18.8 percent for developing countries (Table 5 , panel A).
The relative importance of income -both corporate and personal -and value-added taxes varies signi…cantly across countries and groups of countries. Generally speaking, industrial countries rely heavily on direct taxation, particularly on personal income taxation. In contrast, developing economies rely more on indirect taxation, particularly the value-added tax (Table 5, 
Cyclicality of tax policy
This section presents our main …ndings on the cyclicality of tax policy. To this end, we use several statistical and econometric methods including computing the behavior of tax rates across di¤erent stances of the business cycle, cross-country correlation plots, and panel data regressions. We also use alternative measures to assess the behavior of tax policy over the business cycle such as percentage changes and cyclical components of tax rates. While using the cyclical component of the …scal variable is the typical approach when focusing on government consumption (which is a "continuos" variable), the choice of this strategy is less obvious when focusing on a …scal variable, such as tax rate, that changes less frequently, as discussed in Subsection 3.3). As we will see next, our main …ndings are robust to all these considerations.
In each case we analyze the behavior of each tax rate as well as that of a tax index that weights the behavior of each tax rate by its relative importance. Speci…cally, the change in the tax rate index is given by
where P IT , CIT , and V AT are -depending on the variable used to measure the behavior of 1 3 See Appendix 4, Table 1A , column 1 for the corresponding country statistics. 1 4 See Appendix 4, Table 1A , columns 2-6 for individual country statistics. 1 5 Appendix 3 reports the year in which the value-added tax was introduced in each country included in our study.
11 tax policy -the percentage change or cyclical components of the personal income tax rate, corporate income tax rate, and value-added tax rate, respectively. The weights w
, and w
V AT i
capture the country's average importance of each tax as a proportion of total tax revenues. This weighting structure aims at capturing the relative relevance of each tax in the tax system. The use of a country's average avoids undesired short-term responses of tax bases (and therefore, tax collection and weights)
to changes in tax rates.
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Preliminary analysis
We start by performing a preliminary analysis of the cyclicality of tax policy using some simple statistics and cross-country correlation plots. Table 6 shows the average percentage tax rate change evaluated at di¤erent stances of the business cycle for industrial and developing countries. While industrial countries reduce personal income tax rates both in good and bad times, developing economies sharply decrease them in good times. This suggests that personal income tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing ones. Corporate income tax rates increase in good times in industrial countries but increase in bad times in developing economies, which suggests that corporate income tax policy is countercyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing ones. Valueadded tax rates decrease in good times in industrial countries and increase in bad times in developing economies. Therefore, both industrial and developing countries appear to be procyclical. The tax index, as de…ned in equation (1), decreases both in good and bad times in industrial countries. On the other hand, the tax index falls in good times and increases in bad times in developing economies.
Tax policy thus appears to be acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries.
We now analyze tax behavior at the country level. For this purpose we show country correlations between the cyclical components of each tax rate and real GDP. 17 Figure 9 shows the correlations for the personal income tax rate. Industrial countries are evenly distributed: nine countries have countercyclical tax policy (i.e., positive correlation) and eleven countries show procyclicality (i.e., negative correlation). In sharp contrast, the number of developing economies pursuing procyclical tax policy is more than twice as many as the ones showing countercyclical tax policy. Figure 10 reports analogous results for the case of the corporate income tax. Once again, the distribution of industrial countries is about even: eleven countries have countercyclical tax policy (i.e., positive correlation) and nine countries show procyclical tax policy (i.e., negative correlation). In contrast, the number of developing countries pursuing procyclical policies is more than twice as many as the ones showing countercyclical policy. Figure 11 shows country correlations between the cyclical components of value-added tax rate and real GDP. Unlike the pattern observed in Figures 9 and 10, about half of both industrial and developing countries show procyclical policy and less than a third show countercyclicality. Figure 12 shows country correlations between the cyclical tax index, as de…ned in equation (1), and real GDP. In some cases, a country's tax policy cyclicality re ‡ects similar behavior of di¤erent types of tax rates over the business cycle. For example, personal and corporate income as well as value-added tax rates are procyclical in Bulgaria, Mexico, and Peru. Conversely, taxes are countercyclical in Germany and Switzerland. In some other cases, the cyclicality of the tax rates varies across types of taxes;
however, the overall behavior of the tax index mainly re ‡ects that of the key taxes. For example, the tax index of Georgia shows a procyclical tax policy. While the value-added tax is strongly procyclical, corporate and personal income taxes are countercyclical. The procyclicality of the tax system captured by the tax index re ‡ects that value-added tax collection represents almost two thirds of total revenues.
In a similar vein, on the whole New Zealand exhibits a countercyclical tax policy. While personal and corporate income are countercyclical, the value-added tax is procyclical. The procyclicality of the tax system captured by the tax index re ‡ects that while direct taxation represent almost two thirds of revenues, value-added tax collection corresponds to only around 20 percent.
In line with Figures, 9, 10, and 11, Figure 12 shows that industrial countries are evenly distributed:
nine countries have countercyclical tax policy (i.e., positive correlation) while eleven countries show procyclical tax policy (i.e., negative correlation). Interestingly, but not surprisingly, United Kingdom, United States, Norway, and Switzerland pursue the most countercyclical tax policies among the industrial countries. At the other end of the spectrum, Spain, Italy, and Greece's tax policies are procyclical with correlation levels close to that of Mexico and Ghana. The number of developing countries pursuing procyclical policies is almost three times as many as those showing countercyclical tax policy.
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Regression analysis
We now exploit the panel nature of our dataset. Table 7 shows panel country …xed-e¤ects regressions both for the percentage change in tax rates (Panel A) as well as for the cyclical component of tax rates (Panel B). Both measures point to similar …ndings. Tax policy is mostly acyclical for industrial countries. With the exception of the value-added tax (columns 5), acyclicality is supported both for personal (columns 1) and corporate (columns 3) income taxes as well as for the tax index (columns 8). On the contrary, tax policy is mostly procyclical in developing countries. These …ndings strongly support the ones obtained in Table 6 and Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12. In sum, our analysis strongly supports the idea that tax policy is, broadly speaking, acyclical in industrial countries and procyclical in developing countries. Of course, correlations do not imply any particular direction of causation and it could well be that real GDP is responding to changes in tax policy rather than the other way around.
The next section addresses such endogeneity concerns.
Addressing endogeneity
The panel data regression analysis of the previous section characterized the degree of pro/counter cyclicality of tax policy -both at the individual tax level and aggregate tax index -exploiting the comovements between the cyclical components of tax rates and real GDP. This implicitly assumes that there is no reverse causality; that is, causality runs from business cycle ‡uctuations to tax policy changes and not the other way around. While this has been the traditional approach in the …scal procyclicality literature, more recent studies (Rigobon, 2004; Jaimovich and Panizza, 2007; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008) have shown that ignoring the problem of endogeneity can potentially lead to a misleading picture. In other words, the alleged procyclicality of tax policy identi…ed in Section 5 could just re ‡ect the e¤ect of tax multipliers: when tax rates increase (decrease) output decreases (increases).
This section addresses endogeneity concerns by using instrumental variables. We use three instruments that have already been used in the literature. First, we use an instrument suggested by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007):
where RGDP GR j measures real GDP growth rate in country j, ij is the fraction of exports from country i to country j, and X i =GDP i measures country's i's average exports expressed as share of 14 GDP. 18 This index of weighted real GDP growth of trading partners attempts to capture an external shock.
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Second, we use another external shock: changes in price of exports. This terms of trade based variable has been commonly suggested as a driver of business cycles (Mendoza, 1995; Ilzetzki and Vegh, 2008) . The e¤ective change of prices of exports is measured as follows:
where P XGR i measures price of exports growth rate in country i. This variable aims to capture the e¤ective change of prices of exports. 20 Lastly, we use an instrument proposed by Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) who suggest using the change of real returns on U.S. Treasury bills to capture global liquidity conditions.
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In this section we also account for concerns regarding the structure of errors in the regression analysis. We allow errors to exhibit arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-country correlation (i.e., clustered by country). The relaxation of the non-autocorrelation assumption is important for a study using the cyclical components of both dependent variables and regressors. 1 8 As discussed in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007, page 13) "a time-invariant measure of exports over GDP is used because a time-variant measure would be a¤ected by real exchange rate ‡uctuations, and, therefore, by domestic factors. This is not the case for the fraction of exports going to a speci…c country...because the variation of the exchange rate that is due to domestic factors has an equal e¤ect on both numerator and denominator." 1 9 Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008, page 20) argue that while it is unlikely that current government spending of smaller economies has an e¤ect on the growth rates of their trading partners, which include mainly larger economies, this could be the true in the case of larger economies in the sample and hence suggest that results for high-income countries should be taken with a grain of salt. Instead, for industrial countries' regressions, we use the lagged year trade partners real GDP growth rates (i.e., RGDP GR j;t 1 ) rather than the current ones to avoid reverse causality concerns.
2 0 Large economies may a¤ect commodity prices due to agregate demand arguments. Therefore, for industrial countries' regressions, we use the lagged year price of exports growth rate (i.e., P XGR i;t 1 ) rather than the current ones to avoid reverse causality concerns.
2 1 Since global liquidity conditions may also have direct e¤ects on governments'…scal decisions, we include our measure of U.S. interest rates as an instrument for output as well as a determinant of the behavior of tax policy.
2 2 Since this instrument might be endogenous in the case of the United States, we exclude this country from the instrumental variables analysis.
2 3 In order to make appropiate comparisons, we only use observations where all tax rate data are available.
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Our instrumental variable regressions (Table 8) generally support those …ndings from the previous section (i.e., Table 7 ). As expected, instrumental variable estimates are less e¢ cient (i.e., standard errors are a little bit larger). Two di¤erences are worth noting. First, while developing countries pursue procyclical value-added tax policy, industrial countries'procyclicality vanishes once endogeneity concerns are addressed (Table 8 , columns 5). The latter occurs because (i) there is a shift in the coe¢ cient distribution function to the right (from -0.26 in Table 7 to 0.16 in Table 8 ) and (ii) there is a widening in the coe¢ cient distribution function (from an absolute t-statistic value of 2.6 in Table   7 to 1.1 in Table 8 ). The latter feature is typical of IV regressions; estimates are less e¢ cient. The …rst change supports the presumption regarding the relevance of reverse causality. That is to say, an increase (decrease) in value-added tax rates decreases (increases) output in industrial countries and not the other way around. This rationale is consistent with Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and Vuletin (2012) who …nd sizable tax multipliers for industrial countries. The second di¤erence with our …ndings in the previous section is that developing countries' procyclicality in corporate taxation vanishes once endogeneity concerns are addressed (Table 8 , columns 4).
To sum up, after addressing endogeneity concerns, we …nd that tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries. Such acyclicality is present not only at an aggregate level (i.e., tax index) but also for personal and corporate income tax rates as well as value-added taxation. On the other hand, procyclicality dominates the behavior of tax policy in developing countries both at the aggregate and individual tax level, with the exception of corporate taxation.
Some evidence from average marginal personal income data
This section performs econometric analysis similar to that of Sections 5.2 and 6 using average marginal personal income tax rates for six industrial economies (Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States) for which there exists long time series covering between 18 and 28 years.
24
It is worth noting that the Spearman rank correlation between our top personal income marginal tax rate and the average marginal is 0.26. Such relationship is statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level, supporting the use of top marginal rates as a proxy for average marginal ones.
Columns 1 in Table 9 show analogous basic panel regressions to that of columns 1 in Table 7 using average marginal as opposed to top marginal tax rates. Similarly, columns 2 in Table 9 show similar instrumental variables panel regressions to that of columns 1 Table 8 . 25 ;26 In line with our previous …ndings, tax rate policy is acyclical even after accounting for endogeneity problems.
8 Cyclicality of …scal (tax and spending) policies
Up to now, we have focused our analysis on the cyclicality of tax policy. We have found robust evidence that, in line with the behavior of government spending, industrial countries follow acyclical policies while developing countries are mostly procyclical. We now focus on the relationship between the cyclicality of tax policy and that of spending. In particular, we would like to know how strong is the relationship between the behavior of tax and spending policies over the business cycle. 
Model
Several hypothesis have been put forth in the literature to explain the procyclical behavior of government spending in developing countries, ranging from limited access to international credit markets (Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti, and Talvi, 1996; Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Riascos and Vegh, 2003; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2004) to political distortions that tend to encourage public spending during boom periods (Velasco, 1997; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Talvi and Vegh, 2005) .
This section develops a simple static model of optimal …scal policy in the presence of uncertainty and incomplete markets that can generate both procyclical government spending and procyclical tax rate policy in response to ‡uctuations in output. 28 We will show that while government spending is procyclical, the cyclicality of the tax rate depends on the cyclical behavior of public versus private spending.
2 5 In order to be able to include the United States in our instrumental variable regressions we do not include our measure of U.S. interest rates in the analisis.
2 6 Unfortunately, for this very small sample, instruments are weak for percentage changes in tax rates (Table 9 , panel A, column 2).
2 7 In order to make appropiate comparisons, we only use observations where both tax index as well as spending data are available.
2 8 Due to space limitations we do not solve the complete markets case; see Vegh (2011) . In the presence of complete markets, there would be acyclicality both in spending and tax policies.
Consider a one-period small open economy perfectly integrated into goods markets. There is a single tradable good in the world. There is uncertainty regarding the exogenous output path
where y > 0, > 0, and H and L denote the high output and low output state of nature, respectively.
Output follows a binomial distribution with equal probability for each state of nature. Since E(y) = y and V (y) = 2 , an increase in represents a mean preserving spread.
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Preferences follow the standard expected utility approach:
g 6 = 1 and c 6 = 1;
where g is government spending, c represents private consumption, and 1 > > 0:
The household constraints are given by 30
where is the consumption tax. 31 The household chooses fc H ; c L g to maximize utility (5) subject to the constraints (6).
The government's constraints are given by
The government chooses fg H ; g L ; H ; L g to maximize utility (5) subject to constraints (7) and the implementability conditions derived from the household's problem.
Combining the household's constraints, given by expressions (6), with the government's, given by equations (7), we obtain the economy's aggregate constraints:
2 9 Similar results would hold if the probability of each state of nature were allowed to di¤er from 0.5. However, the income process would need to be slightly modi…ed for an increase in to still capture a mean preserving spread. In particular, y H = y + (1 p) and y L = y p , where p is the probability of the high state of nature.
3 0 For simplicity, and with no loss of generality, we assume initial assets equal to zero. 3 1 Similar results would hold for income taxation.
For further reference, let us de…ne two measures of cyclicality. The …rst measure ( g ) captures the cyclicality of government spending:
A positive value of this measure, which means that g H > g L , would indicate procyclicality of government spending. Conversely, a negative value would be consistent with countercyclicality. If g H = g L , then g = 0 implying acyclicality.
By the same token, the second measure ( ) captures the cyclicality of tax rates:
A positive value of this measure, which means that H > L , would indicate countercyclicality of tax policy. Conversely, a negative value would be consistent with procyclicality. If H = L , then = 0 implying acyclicality.
Solving the Ramsey's planner problem we obtain the following four propositions.
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Proposition 1 Government spending is procyclical.
Naturally, the absence of complete markets induces the government to spend more in good times than in bad times. Formally,
Proposition 2 Tax policy may be procyclical, countercyclical, or acyclical depending on the relationship between g and c . For the most realistic parameterization, where c > g , tax policy is procyclical.
Formally,
From proposition 1, g > 0. The …rst term is positive if c < g , zero if c = g , and negative if c > g . Hence, the tax rate is countercyclical if c < g , acyclical if c = g , and procyclical if c > g .
In order to understand the roles of c and g , it is important to recall that, taking into account (7) and (10), we can re-write (12) as follows
Therefore, the tax rate cyclicality is tightly linked to the optimal ratio g=c across states of nature:
If g=c is constant across states of nature (i.e.,
Since c and g increase proportionately in the good state of nature, the higher tax base allows the Ramsey planner to leave the tax rate unchanged ( H = L ; acyclical tax rates). This case results when c = g . Same results obtain when using CES preferences.
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If
Since c increase less than proportionately than g in the good state of nature, the lower tax base induces the Ramsey planner to increase the tax rate ( H > L ; countercyclical tax rates). This case results when c < g .
Since c increase more than proportionately than g in the good state of nature, the much higher tax base induces the Ramsey planner to reduce the tax rate ( H < L ; procyclical tax rates). This case results when c > g .
The data supports the latter case where the g=c ratio is higher is bad times than in good times. In other words, for the most realistic parameterization where c > g , tax policy is procyclical (i.e., < 0). If the ratio of government spending to private consumption (the tax base) is higher (lower) in the bad (good) state of nature, tax rate policy is procyclical. Intuitively, if government spending is high relative to the tax base in bad times, then the tax rate will need to be high as well in order to satisfy the government budget constraint. In good times, a low level of government spending relative to the tax base calls for a lower tax rate.
Proposition 3 Government spending procyclicality is increasing in output volatility.
Proposition 1 shows that the absence of complete markets induces government to spend more in good times than in bad times. Naturally, higher output volatility increases spending procyclicality.
Formally, from (11) it is straightforward
because
Proposition 4 For the most realistic parameterization, where c > g , tax policy procyclicality is increasing in output volatility.
Formally, from (12) it follows that
because from (14)
Moreover, from (13) and (15), it follows that
From proposition 2 we know that, under the most realistic parameterization where c > g , the ratio of government spending to private consumption -which is the tax base -is higher (lower) in the bad (good) state of nature. Therefore, tax rate policy is procyclical. Equations (15) and (16) show that tax policy procyclicality is increasing in output volatility because the di¤erence between the optimal g=c ratio in good and bad states of nature increases with output volatility. In other words, the pressure to collect (i.e., higher tax rates) is more important the larger is the economic downturn and less important during boom periods.
We now show that propositions 3 and 4 are supported by the data. Indeed, Figures 14 and 15 show that government spending and tax policy cyclicality are increasing in output volatility. The positive relationship between government spending cyclicality and output volatility shown in Figure 14 has been 21 previously identi…ed in the literature (Lane, 2003; Talvi and Vegh, 2005; Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin, 2012) . However, the positive relationship between tax policy cyclicality and output volatility ( Figure   15 ) is a novel …nding. We do not claim that this is the only way to explain procyclicality of spending and, more importantly for the purposes of our paper, tax policy. Having clari…ed that, it is worth noting that our simple model of optimal …scal policy under incomplete markets (i) rationalizes why spending and tax policies are more procyclical in developing countries than in industrial economies and
(ii) calls attention to the fact that while it is fairly simple to rationalize procyclicality of government spending, explaining the procyclicality of tax policy requires further structure.
Conclusions
There is by now a strong consensus in the literature that government spending has been typically procyclical in developing countries and countercyclical or acyclical in industrial economies. The evidence on the taxation side is, however, almost non-existent due to the lack of data on tax rates. To analyze the cyclical properties of tax rate policy, we build a novel dataset on tax rates for 62 countries for the period 1960-2009 that comprises corporate income, personal income, and value-added tax rates.
We …nd that, by and large, tax policy is acyclical in industrial countries but procyclical in developing countries. We show that the evidence is consistent with a model of optimal …scal policy under uncertainty. In the model, government spending is always procyclical. Tax rate policy is procyclical as long as the ratio of public to private consumption is high in bad times and low in good times (the relevant case in practice). The model also predicts that both government spending and tax rates will be more procyclical the larger is output volatility. This prediction of the model is consistent with the evidence. We also …nd that countries with more procyclical spending policy typically have more procyclical tax policy and vice-versa. In other words, tax and spending policies are typically conducted in a symmetric/homogeneous way over the business cycle.
This novel data also allows us to uncover some new empirical regularities regarding the volatility of tax policy. We …nd that, similar to the behavior on the spending side, tax policy is more volatile in developing countries than in industrial economies in the sense that developing countries change their tax rates by larger amounts than industrial economies.
Government tax structure data
Government Finance Statistics (GFS-IMF) was the data source for Government tax structure data. Data for Australia were from Australian Government Budget Office. The variables are defined as follows: tax revenue (Central government, taxes. Series cB_BA_11 and aB_BA_11), tax revenue on income, profits and corporations (Central government, taxes on income, profits and corporations. Series cB_BA_111 and aB_BA_111), personal income tax revenue (Central government, taxes on individuals. Series cB_BA_1111 and aB_BA_1111), corporate income tax revenue (Central government, taxes on corporations. Series cB_BA_1112 and aB_BA_1112), goods and services tax revenue (Central government, taxes on goods and services. Series cB_BA_114 and aB_BA_114), and value added tax revenue (Central government, value added tax. Series cB_BA_11411 and aB_BA_11411). Data period covers 1990-2009. 
Exports of goods and services (as % of GDP)
Global interest rate
Global interest rate was calculated by deflating the returns on U.S. Treasuries by the CPI inflation rate of the previous year. As Ilzetzki and Végh (2008) , we use an adaptive-expectations measure of real interest rates. These variables were obtained from International Financial Statistics (IFS-IMF). Data period covers 1960-2009.
Real external shock (ShockJP)
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